The Will for Peace 2026 Naval Exercise: What Happened

Between 9 and 16 January 2026, South Africa's Simon's Town Naval Base — the headquarters of the South African Navy on the shores of False Bay — became the stage for one of the most diplomatically charged military exercises in the country's post-apartheid history. Exercise Will for Peace 2026, led by China and hosted by South Africa, brought together warships from five nations at the strategic junction between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

Originally planned as "Mosi III" — the third iteration of a biennial exercise series involving South Africa, China, and Russia — the event was postponed from its intended November 2025 date to avoid clashing with the G20 summit in Johannesburg. It was renamed under Chinese direction and expanded to include additional BRICS+ members. The expanded roster proved explosive: alongside the expected Chinese and Russian contingents, Iran dispatched three warships, including the IRGC Navy's expeditionary base ship IRIS Shahid Mahdavi, a vessel capable of launching ballistic missiles.

The participating naval assets were substantial. China contributed the guided-missile destroyer Tangshan and replenishment ship Taihu from its 48th Naval Escort Task Force. Russia sent the corvette Stoikiy and fleet oiler Yelnya from the Baltic Fleet — both shadowed by NATO vessels during their transit through European waters. Iran deployed the corvette IRIS Naghdi, the massive forward base ship IRIS Makran, and the IRIS Shahid Mahdavi. The UAE contributed the corvette Bani Yas, marking the Emirates' first-ever warship visit to South Africa. South Africa's own frigate SAS Amatola rounded out the formation.

The exercise was structured in two phases: port and shore-based activities from 9–12 January, including ship tours and professional exchanges, followed by a sea phase from 13–15 January featuring formation manoeuvres, maritime strike drills, hostage rescue operations, and medical evacuation exercises. Indonesia, Ethiopia, and Brazil attended as observers. Notably absent were India — the current BRICS chair — Brazil as a full participant, and Egypt.

India's absence was particularly telling. New Delhi publicly distanced itself from the exercise, with the Ministry of External Affairs clarifying that it was "entirely a South African initiative" and "not a regular or institutionalised BRICS activity." This distinction undercut Pretoria's primary defence — that Will for Peace was a routine BRICS event rather than a deliberate alignment with sanctioned states.

The Iran Crisis Within the Crisis

The exercise's timing could hardly have been worse for South Africa. As warships gathered in False Bay, Iran was experiencing its most severe wave of domestic unrest since the 1979 revolution. Protests that erupted in late December 2025 over inflation and currency collapse had escalated into a nationwide uprising, with Iranian security forces responding with lethal force. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei acknowledged that thousands had been killed. Meanwhile, in Washington, legislation to renew the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) was making its way through Congress — and South Africa's continued access was far from guaranteed.

Is South Africa Still Non-Aligned? The Hollowing-Out Question

South Africa's official foreign policy doctrine rests on the principle of "non-alignment". In simple terms, this means refusing to permanently take sides — not joining Team USA or Team China, but keeping friendly relations with everyone and making decisions issue by issue. Think of it as the geopolitical equivalent of being an independent voter: you listen to all parties, you trade with everyone, and you don't let any single power tell you what to do. This was the cornerstone of the post-apartheid diplomatic posture articulated by Nelson Mandela — born from the experience of a country that had been isolated by the world for decades and wanted to engage with all of it once free.

But the gap between the theory and the practice has never been wider. Critics argue that South Africa's version of "non-alignment" has become a euphemism for siding with authoritarian states while claiming neutrality. The pattern is hard to ignore: abstaining on UN votes condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine, declining to arrest Putin under the ICC warrant, hosting joint naval exercises with Iran and Russia, while simultaneously cancelling military cooperation with the United States and withdrawing its ambassador from Israel.

The criticism is multi-layered. Critics including the Democratic Alliance, defence analysts, and Western diplomatic observers point to a pattern that goes beyond a single exercise. The ANC's historical ties to the Soviet Union — which provided crucial support during the anti-apartheid struggle — have evolved into a contemporary affinity with Moscow that persists despite Russia's invasion of Ukraine. South Africa abstained from multiple UN General Assembly votes condemning the invasion, declined to enforce the ICC arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin (who was invited to the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg), and has continued to expand military cooperation with Moscow.

The relationship with Iran follows a similar trajectory but carries even sharper risks. Iran's addition to BRICS in 2024 gave the relationship an institutional framework, but the depth of military engagement has alarmed analysts. In August 2025, SANDF Chief General Rudzani Maphwanya visited Tehran and — according to Iranian state media — pledged "common goals" with Iran, endorsed its stance on Gaza, and called for deeper strategic alignment. Both the Department of International Relations (DIRCO) and the Defence Ministry publicly distanced themselves from his remarks, and Ramaphosa's spokesperson confirmed the president had neither known about nor authorised the visit.

The academic framing is instructive. Research published in Contemporary Security Policy identifies two competing interpretations of non-alignment within the ANC itself: an ideological version that equates non-alignment with anti-Western imperialism, and a strategic version that sees it as a tool for maximising autonomy. Under the ideological reading, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is filtered through the lens of NATO expansion and Western hypocrisy. Under the strategic reading, alienating the US and EU — which together account for 30% of South African exports — makes no rational sense.

AGOA & the Economic Consequences: What South Africa Stands to Lose

The economic dimension of South Africa's tripartite entanglement centres on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) — a US trade preference programme that has been the backbone of duty-free African exports to the American market since 2000. For South Africa specifically, AGOA has been enormously consequential: the country was the top supplier of non-crude oil AGOA imports, with passenger vehicles and parts alone accounting for 64% of its eligible products in 2024.

The programme's recent history reads like a slow-motion crisis. AGOA expired on 30 September 2025 after the Trump administration showed no inclination to renew it. Combined with the sweeping "reciprocal" tariffs imposed in April 2025 — which hit South Africa with a 30% rate, among the highest globally — the lapse devastated trade flows. South African auto exports to the US plummeted nearly 75% in 2025, falling from 25,544 vehicles to just 6,530.

Congress eventually passed a one-year AGOA extension through December 2026, signed by Trump on 3 February 2026 as part of a broader spending package. But the extension was dramatically shorter than previous renewals — nine years less than the last one — and came loaded with conditions. USTR Jamieson Greer stated the administration's intention to "modernise the program to align with President Trump's America First Trade Policy," signalling that future access would require reciprocal concessions on market access, critical minerals, and strategic alignment.

South Africa's annual eligibility for AGOA is decided by the US president based on statutory criteria — and the upcoming December review is expected to be contentious. The combination of the naval exercises, the genocide case against Israel, Trump's baseless claims about persecution of white South Africans, and Ramaphosa's public criticism of Trump as "truly uninformed" has created an unusually hostile political environment.

The trade diversification strategy is already underway. South Africa signed a new agreement in early 2026 aimed at securing duty-free entry for select agricultural exports into China's consumer market. China is already Pretoria's largest trading partner, with more than $13.5 billion in South African exports — largely minerals and metals — flowing to China in 2025. As one analyst put it, Trump is "making China great again" in Africa.

The Shadow Fleet Question: Are South African Ports Being Used?

The question of whether sanctioned Russian or Iranian "shadow fleet" vessels are using South African ports — particularly Simon's Town — to bypass international sanctions is one of the most sensitive and least publicly documented aspects of the tripartite relationship. The shadow fleet, an armada of aging, poorly maintained tankers of opaque ownership, now numbers over 1,000 vessels — at least one in every five oil tankers worldwide — and facilitates roughly 65% of Russian seaborne oil trade.

The concern is not abstract. South Africa's strategic position at the junction of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans makes it a natural waypoint for vessels circumnavigating Africa — a route that has become increasingly important as Red Sea disruptions (first from Houthi attacks, now from the Iran war) have forced shipping away from the Suez Canal. Western enforcement authorities have dramatically escalated their crackdown: in 2025 alone, 623 vessels were added to sanctions lists, compared to 225 the previous year. Since December 2025, at least 14 shadow fleet ships have been seized, detained, or boarded by US, Indian, and European authorities.

The precedent that heightened this concern was the Lady R affair of December 2022, when a US-sanctioned Russian cargo vessel docked at Simon's Town Naval Base under cover of night. US Ambassador Reuben Brigety publicly accused South Africa of loading weapons onto the ship destined for Russia — an allegation that triggered a diplomatic crisis, caused the rand to plummet, and prompted Ramaphosa to appoint an independent panel of inquiry. The panel found no evidence of arms being loaded for export; it concluded the ship had been delivering military equipment ordered by South Africa's arms procurement agency Armscor under a pre-COVID contract.

Whether shadow fleet tankers are actively using South African ports to transfer, refuel, or conduct ship-to-ship transfers remains unclear. The January 2026 exercise, which brought Russian and Iranian naval vessels into Simon's Town harbour, has intensified scrutiny. Western maritime intelligence services are monitoring South African waters more closely than at any point since the Cold War.

The Moral Consistency Paradox: ICJ Idealism Meets Geopolitical Pragmatism

South Africa's genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice — filed in December 2023 — stands as perhaps the most consequential act of international legal advocacy by any Global South state in a generation. The ICJ found the case plausible, ordered provisional measures, and the proceedings continue. Countries including Iceland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Ireland have since filed interventions. The case has given South Africa enormous moral credibility in much of the world — particularly across the Global South, the Muslim world, and among international human rights communities.

But this moral authority sits in uncomfortable tension with South Africa's relationships with Russia and Iran — both states accused of their own systematic human rights violations.

The counter-argument from the ANC and its supporters is that the West's own moral consistency is equally questionable — the United States is now intervening in the ICJ case on Israel's behalf, and Western nations armed and supported numerous authoritarian regimes when it suited their strategic interests. The South African Communist Party has described criticism of the Iran relationship as an attempt by "Western imperialist forces" to compromise South Africa's sovereign right to formulate its own foreign policy.

Who Is in Charge? The SANDF Civilian Oversight Crisis

Perhaps the most alarming dimension of the Will for Peace saga is what it revealed about civilian control over the South African military. The sequence of events raises fundamental constitutional questions about whether the SANDF is operating as an instrument of elected civilian authority — or pursuing its own foreign policy agenda.

The Timeline of Confusion

• August 2025

  SANDF Chief Visits Tehran

  Gen. Maphwanya travels to Iran without Ramaphosa's knowledge, pledges "common goals" with Tehran. DIRCO and Defence Ministry publicly distance themselves. Ramaphosa's spokesperson calls the visit "ill-advised."

• 30 Dec 2025

  Will for Peace Announced

  SANDF confirms the renamed exercise (from Mosi III) will take place 9–16 January, led by China, with Iranian and Russian participation.

• 9 Jan 2026

  Ramaphosa Orders Iran's Exclusion

  After reportedly being alerted by the US Embassy about the damage Iran's participation would cause, Ramaphosa convenes a meeting with key ministers and orders Iran's withdrawal or downgrade to observer status.

• 12 Jan 2026

  Iran Reportedly "Withdraws" — Then Doesn't

  Daily Maverick reports that Iran will not join the sea phase. However, all three Iranian warships remain in False Bay throughout the exercise.

• 14 Jan 2026

  SANDF Posts — Then Deletes — Confirmation

  The SANDF posts on Facebook that the Iranian corvette IRIS Naghdi participated in the sea phase alongside four other warships. The post is later deleted.

• 16 Jan 2026

  Board of Inquiry Established

  Defence Minister Motshekga announces a Board of Inquiry with seven days to report. She confirms the president's orders were "clearly communicated to all parties."

• 28 Jan 2026

  Inquiry Panel Named

  Three retired judges and a retired rear admiral appointed to investigate, chaired by Judge Bernard Ngoepe.

• 27 Feb 2026

  Probe Moved to Presidency

  After more than a month of no progress from the SANDF side, Ramaphosa relocates the inquiry to his office "to ensure an independent and timeous probe." The panel is given one month to report.

The explanations offered have been contradictory and unsatisfying. The Presidency claimed the drills were "facilitated and led by China, not South Africa" and that Beijing handled invitations — implying Pretoria had limited control. Defence analyst Helmoed-Römer Heitman mapped the chain of command: the Navy Chief (Vice Admiral Monde Lobese) would have been outside the direct operational line, which ran from the Chief of Joint Operations (Lt Gen Siphiwe Sangweni) through the SANDF Chief (Gen Maphwanya) to the Commander-in-Chief (Ramaphosa).

The Iran War Complicates Everything

On 28 February 2026 — barely six weeks after the Will for Peace exercise concluded — the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and dozens of senior military and political officials. The operation, described by Washington as "anticipatory self-defence" targeting Iran's nuclear capabilities, triggered an ongoing conflict that has fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape in which South Africa's tripartite relationships operate.

Pretoria's response has been characteristically careful — and characteristically criticised from all sides. Ramaphosa described the strikes as an act of "anticipatory self-defence" that is "not permitted under the United Nations Charter," language widely read as a critique of the US and Israel. But South Africa stopped short of condemning the operation outright. Zane Dangor, director-general of the foreign ministry, declared that South Africa has "no reason to cut ties with Iran" — even as the ANC dispatched a delegation to the Iranian Embassy to pay respects following Khamenei's killing.

The economic consequences for South Africa are severe and immediate. Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz — through which 20% of global petroleum liquids pass — has spiked energy costs and disrupted supply chains. The South African Reserve Bank has announced it will redraft its economic risk scenarios in response. The rand hit a three-month low in early March. For a country whose economy grew just 0.6% in 2025, any additional headwinds are potentially devastating.

The broader African context adds another dimension. Most African countries have been conspicuously cautious about the Iran war. The African Union called for "restraint, urgent de-escalation, and sustained dialogue." Even South Africa could only issue a muted critique. As the Council on Foreign Relations observed, African countries have "refused to side with Iran" — a significant disappointment for Tehran given its diplomatic and military initiatives across the continent. Horn of Africa states have generally aligned with Gulf monarchies; only South Africa and Senegal have invoked international law to criticise the strikes.

Outlook: What Comes Next

South Africa enters the second half of 2026 navigating the most complex foreign policy environment of its democratic era. Several key inflection points will shape the trajectory of the tripartite relationship and its consequences.

The fundamental strategic question for South Africa has not changed since the end of apartheid: how to balance principled independence with economic interdependence. What has changed is the cost structure. In the 1990s and 2000s, non-alignment was relatively cheap — the US and Europe valued South Africa as a democratic success story and extended generous trade terms with few geopolitical strings. In the 2020s, the world has fragmented, blocs have hardened, and the price of sitting between them has risen sharply.

The Rosatom dimension adds a further complication. In March 2026, the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation signed a memorandum of understanding with Russia's Rosatom — recalling a controversial 2014 deal struck shortly after Russia's annexation of Crimea. If Pretoria proceeds toward Russian-built nuclear power, it would deepen the structural dependency on Moscow at precisely the moment when the costs of that relationship are becoming most apparent.

For South African business leaders, the message is increasingly blunt. FirstRand CEO Mary Vilakazi urged the government to adopt "a much more neutral stance" to prevent international investors from associating the country with geopolitical risk. Donald MacKay of XA Global Trade Advisors said the Supreme Court's tariff ruling was welcome but insufficient: "Everyone has to diversify from the US." The paradox is that diversification toward China and the BRICS+ bloc is precisely what Washington views as alignment against its interests.

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